National Security Strategy: Priority Risks
Tier One: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be those of highest priority for UK national security looking ahead, taking account of both likelihood and impact.
• International terrorism afecting the UK or its interests, including a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack by terrorists; and/or a signiicant increase in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland.
• Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cyber crime.
• A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response, such as severe coastal flooding afecting three or more regions of the UK, or an inluenza pandemic.
• An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK, and its allies as well as other states and non-state actors.

Tier Two: The National Security Council considered the following groups of risks to be the next highest priority looking ahead, taking account of both likelihood and impact. (For example, a CBRN attack on the UK by a state was judged to be low likelihood, but high impact.)
• An attack on the UK or its Oversees Territories by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

3.34 International crises can be sparked by a multitude of sources. Changes in regional power balances – the rise of some powers and the decline of others – can themselves be the source of crises. Conflict and instability within failed or failing states can spill over into disputes with neighbouring states. The ambitions of states to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities could trigger international crises and armed conlict. Malign powers may wish to exert inluence that impacts on the security of our vital networks, including for example our energy supplies, or that could have an adverse effect on the international system of trade and commerce upon which our prosperity relies. The nature of crises will often involve a blurring between the actions of states and non-state actors, between crime and conlict, and between combatants and civilians. Such crises can arise, and change in nature, rapidly and unpredictably.

Experts agree that there is a high probability of another influenza pandemic occurring, and this probability is unchanged, regardless of the timing of the recent Swine Flu pandemic. It is impossible to forecast its exact timing or the precise nature of its impact. Based on historical information, scientific evidence and modelling, the following impacts are possible:

• Many millions of people around the world will become infected, causing global disruption and a potential humanitarian crisis. The World Health Organization estimates that between 2 million and 7.4 million deaths may occur globally.

• Up to one half of the UK population may become infected and there may be between 50,000 and 750,000 additional deaths (that is deaths that would not have happened
over the same period of time had a pandemic not taken place) by the end of a pandemic.

• Normal life is likely to face wide social and economic disruption; significant threats to the continuity of essential services; lower production levels; shortages

Over the past 25 years, more than 30 new, or newly recognised, infections have been identified around the world. The pattern of known infections also changes as the area where disease is constantly present expand beyond traditional limits. Most of these newly recognised infections are zoonotic - they are naturally transmissible, directly or indirectly, between vertebrate animals and humans. By their very nature, zoonotic infections can be more challenging to monitor.

Although it is unlikely that a new infectious disease would originate in the UK, it is highly probable that one could emerge in another country. Given the ease and speed
with which people can travel around the world, it is therefore possible that a new infection could spread rapidly before it is detected, and be transmitted to the UK. New diseases therefore pose a potential threat to the health of the UK population, and may present social and economic challenges.

GENERAL ADVICE ON PREPARING FOR EMERGENCIES

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• Try to reassure others around you

Avoid alarming the public unnecessarily

7.5 At the same time, when publishing assessments
and plans, the Regulations require Category 1
responders to have regard to the need not to alarm
the public unnecessarily.[2]

[2] regulation 27

Sensitive information

7.6 Where risk assessments or plans contain sensitive
information,[3] then only edited or summary versions of
all or part of the document should be published.

[3] See regulation 45 and the discussion in Chapter 3

The PUBLIC NEEDS:

* basic details of the incident - what, where, when (and who, why and how, if possible);
* to know the implications for health and welfare;
* advice and guidance (eg stay indoors, symptoms, preparing for evacuation); and
* reassurance (if necessary).

The PUBLIC WANTS to know:

* other practical implications such as the effect on traffic, power supplies, telephones, water supplies, etc;
* a helpline number; and
* what is being done to resolve the situation.

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Warning methods

The methods available to deliver urgent information to members of the public are extremely varied. Some depend on the availability of power supplies or phone lines. Some may require careful consideration of the risks to human life and health, in case at the time of an emergency staff or members of the public are exposed to hazardous substances while they are warning or being warned.

Some warning methods include:

* Mobilising officers to go round on foot and knock on doors;
* From car or helicopter, by loudhailer or other amplified means;
* Media announcements;
* Electronic/variable message boards, eg at the roadside or on motorways;
* Direct radio broadcasts to shipping (in maritime incidents);
* PA announcements in public buildings, shopping centres, sports venues, transport systems, etc.;
* Automated telephone/fax/e-mail/text messages to subscribers; and
* Site sirens.